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Models of creativity based on natural evolution have taken the genetic code of 
modern genetics, and ignored the goal-less nature of Darwin’s original theory. 
This paper uses the comparison with evolutionary theory to suggest that exactly 
the opposite approach should be taken if we plan to more accurately model the 
processes of human design creativity. 
1.0 Introduction 
Evolution in nature has been held as a paradigmatic model for creativity, 
and is exploited in design via evolutionary computation such as genetic al-
gorithms [1] and genetic programming [2]. While these computational 
processes have been shown effective for optimisation, optimisation is not 
the same thing as creative design.  
The ultimate objectives of evolution in nature and design are similar, but 
the mechanism is different, and unfortunately evolutionary computation 
differs from natural evolution in exactly the opposite way to the way de-
sign does. This position paper suggests there are two popular errors in 
these evolutionary models of creative design: 
 Models of creative thought that require an end goal are fundamen-
tally mistaken. On this point they should be more like evolution. 
 Models of creative thought that are based on the manipulation of a 
symbolic code are fundamentally mistaken. On this point they 
should be more like design.  
Design will be compare with evolution to illustrate this position. It will 
be suggested that creativity has more in common with Darwin‘s original 
proposition than with the subsequent additions of modern genetics. 
2  S. Hanna 
 
2.0 Nature has no ‘telos’, and neither does design 
Perhaps the most radical and contentious implication of Darwin‘s theory of 
evolution at the time it was proposed was that it did away with the notion 
of a telos, or end goal in nature. The mechanism of selection from random 
variation made this unnecessary at two scales: at the global level in the 
long term it required no divinely held model of perfection to which succes-
sive generations would approach, and within each generation there was no 
Lamarckian process of adaptation by the effort of individual organisms to 
their own goals. These teleological objectives were replaced by the single 
criterion of survival, which could be achieved by any means—strength, 
agility, camouflage, poison or an unusually large and adaptable brain—to 
suit and exploit any number of possible niches in an ecosystem.  
It is exactly this ability to provide what appear to be good solutions to 
problems that had never been posed as such that makes evolution such a 
powerful model for design. Design tasks—the really creative ones—are 
also rarely posed explicitly. They consist of what Rittel and Webber [3] 
call ‗wicked‘ problems, in that they are ill-defined and their so-called solu-
tions have unforeseeable consequences. Rosenman [4] suggests the lack of 
prior knowledge about a problem is the indication of how much creativity 
is required. A priori goal setting is at odds with creative design. 
The real power of Darwinian evolution to cope with a lack of goal is 
that rather than setting instructions for an outcome beforehand, it can se-
lect the results after they have been produced, and thereby make evalua-
tions holistically. Steadman [5] notes the difference between ‗instructive‘ 
and ‗elective‘ processes in design as equivalent to the theories of Lamarck 
and Darwin respectively. The complexity of an organism, or of a design in 
its social, cultural, stylistic and functional context, means that it cannot be 
reduced to its parts—the way these act and interact together produce the 
emergent and unforeseeable consequences referred to above. The simple 
explanation in Darwin‘s theory is that such emergent complexity is possi-
ble simply because it works. By requiring only ‗survival‘, evolution will 
both select for the whole package and allow the apparent definition of fit-
ness to change. Most thorough accounts of the design process [6,7] empha-
sise the reflective processes (e.g. sketching and discussion) that redefines 
design objectives over time in this way. There is evidence to suggest that 
human designers are also able to evaluate a great deal more in a design 
than they are able to instruct [8]. 
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Our assumption of teleology in design may come from a common sense 
perception of the creative act as a personal, individual phenomenon, and 
from a design profession that does apparently have goals. Social models of 
creativity [9] suggest that this may not actually be so. Even professional 
designers draw the bulk of their output by working within existing types so 
ubiquitous as to be unquestioned and unnoticed, and the small remaining 
portion that is actually novel may still be inspired by what already exists. 
The position of this paper is that all novelty is actually derived from what 
already exists; the mechanism for this is described in the following section.  
3.0 Nature has genotypes, but design does not 
The major non-Darwinian contributions to our modern understanding of 
evolution, from Mendel‘s [10] description of the laws of inheritance to 
Watson and Crick‘s [11] discovery of the molecular structure of DNA, 
pertain to the mechanism by which nature‘s designs are produced. The no-
tion of an underlying code has such an affinity to computation that it is no 
surprise that they have often been adapted as a mechanism for supposedly 
creative systems. This relationship may be partly historical, as the years 
immediately following the discovery of the biological code also focused 
on formal symbol systems [12] as the basis for intelligence and language 
[13]. Much of this work paralleled the ‗central dogma‘ of molecular biol-
ogy, in which information can only be passed in one direction—from 
genotype (the code, or DNA) to phenotype (the organism‘s traits), and 
never the reverse [14]. 
But this has little to do with how design really works, for the simple rea-
son that nothing like this dogma holds for human creativity. Instead of the 
genotype, it is precisely the phenotype, or traits of designed artefacts, that 
as designers we are able to copy or modify in creating a new work. In 
some cases where a genotype is proposed as an analogy to our understand-
ing of human artefacts, it is specifically ‗inverted‘ [15] such that informa-
tion can flow back. To propose a plausible model of creative thought with 
some that resemblance to evolution, it is the notion of a genotype, or any 
fixed symbolic representation, that must be rejected. 
The importance of operating at the level of the phenotype is that while a 
genotype is a fixed, symbolic representation that can only be translated in 
one way, it is at the level of final traits that multiple interpretations may be 
made. The act of reinterpretation has often been identified as important to 
creative thought: Schön [16] calls this ‗seeing-as‘; Koestler [17] discusses 
the ‗bissociation of matrices‘. I would go further to suggest that this act is 
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not only the very root of creative insight and the generation of novelty, but 
it is only through the ability to make multiple interpretations of a single 
phenotype (violating the dogma of molecular biology) that we have the 
ability to be creative in design. 
The argument is not based on new empirical evidence, but because ex-
isting alternative assumptions have less explanatory power. There is a gen-
eral consensus that creativity requires the apparently paradoxical combina-
tion of novelty and utility [18], and this novelty is built in to computational 
models. Evolutionary computation such as genetic algorithms and genetic 
programming rely on a simple random number generator to produce muta-
tions and control gene crossover. Some models are more refined with goal 
directed behaviour, such as Saunders and Gero‘s [19] creative agents, who 
are given a pre-programmed optimal balance between too much and too 
little novelty as suggested by Berlyne [20], but still the generation of that 
novelty is given by random generation. Although a random number gen-
erator can be said to fill in for real variation in the world, and agents might 
be modelled on a belief that we are imbued with an innate élan vital [21], 
these models still beg the question of the explanation of that novelty.   
The ability to make multiple interpretations of a single phenotype ex-
plains how novelty can occur. It can happen in at least two different ways 
roughly analogous to those known to occur in the genotype. Genetic muta-
tion is essentially a copying error in DNA. When an attempt is made to 
faithfully copy phenotype traits of a designed artefact, there is inevitably 
some capacity for unintentional change, becoming more likely the less is 
known about the process by which the original was made (its genotype). 
Genetic crossover is the combination of two dissimilar sets of DNA via 
sex. This is the really big creative bang—Koestler‘s bissocation of dissimi-
lar matrices, or the ―eureka moment‖. Had Archimedes been constrained to 
think in terms of the genotypic properties of baths and votive crowns (e.g. 
the ideal water temperature; how to shape a gold-silver alloy) he would not 
have made a creative leap that depended on phenotypic traits, or resultant 
effects, such as water displacement and density. 
This ability of ‗seeing-as‘, explains this emergence of novelty without 
the need for goal-seeking behaviour or resort to imposed randomness. We 
get something from nothing in that innovation emerges naturally as a con-
sequence simply of observing. 
Many of the apparent contradictions or paradoxes of creativity concern-
ing the trade-off between novelty and utility can be explained. Berlyne 
[20] suggests a curve based on Wundt [22] gives an optimal level of nov-
elty, but there is little to suggest any intrinsic benefit of novelty. Udo Lin-
demann recently questioned such motives at a recent SIG Design Creativ-
ity workshop (DESIGN 2010, notes: Tom Howard), in that it is generally 
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more important just to do things in the best way, rather than a new way. 
For Cropley [18] it is paradoxical that creativity ―requires deviating from 
social norms, but doing this in a way that the society can tolerate‖. These 
points are only contradictory if novelty is measured by a standard metric, 
as would be the case with genotypes. Multiple interpretations of a pheno-
type imply that there is no single standard, so something may be highly 
unusual in one axis of measurement while at the same time instantly rec-
ognisable in another. My novel is not your novel. 
Although little has been done in terms of reinterpreting the phenotype, 
evolution improves simply by changing features of genetic representation 
such as the numerical base [23]. Phenotype operations should be even 
faster at producing innovation, a point on speed that is often made in com-
paring cultural with biological evolution. If this is so, then it would form 
the latest of a set of radical changes in how evolution functions: the begin-
ning of mutation in the genome 3.8 billion years ago; sexual crossover 1.2 
billion years ago; and the cultural copying at the level of the phenotype 
within the last several hundred thousand years. Each of these steps has 
been accompanied by a dramatically increased rate of change. 
4.0 Where research should focus 
The relationship between design and evolution has more to do with the ca-
pacity to naturally select good solutions holistically to emergent criteria 
than with the underlying genetic code that is so often assumed. Design thus 
has more in common with Darwin‘s model, prior to the discovery of a 
coded genotype. In the sense that creativity is often thought to be a some-
what vague and slippery concept, the rejection proposed here both of set 
goals and clear codes is perhaps not surprising, but does raise questions of 
how research might continue. While optimisation can focus on better 
means of search, what can be done without the telos or the code?  
We are not left without a mechanism. For novelty, we need to know 
how interpretation of artefacts occurs. AI is now beginning to explore this, 
through e.g. machine learning and vision, embodied robotics and the 
commonplace manipulation of unprecedented amounts of data by Google. 
For utility, without a telos this seems more difficult, but in design we also 
rely on existing artifacts to guide our choices, basing our assumptions on 
things tested in the real world, where unspecifiable goals constantly arise 
by emergent process. Both elective, goalless processes and novelty genera-
tion are based on observing or interpretation, and these mechanisms pro-
vide much to investigate. 
6  S. Hanna 
References 
1. Holland J H (1975) Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems An Introducto-
ry Analysis with Applications to Biology, Control, and Artificial Intelligence. 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
2. Koza JR (1992) Genetic programming : on the programming of computers by 
means of natural selection, MIT Press. 
3. Rittel HWJ and Webber MM (1984) Planning problems are wicked problems. 
In Cross N (ed.) Developments in Design Methodology, John Wiley and Sons. 
4. Rosenman, M: 1997, The Generation of Form Using an Evolutionary Approach, 
in Dasgupta, D and Michalewicz, Z (eds), Evolutionary Algorithms in Engi-
neering Applications, Springer-Verlag, pp. 69-86. 
5. Steadman P (2008) The Evolution of Designs. Routledge. 
6. Schön DA (1983) The Reflective Practitioner. Basic Books, New York. 
7. Snodgrass AB and Coyne RD (1997) Is designing hermeneutical? Architectural 
Theory Review, 2(1), pp.65–97.  
8. Piaseki M and Hanna S (2010) A Redefinition of the Paradox of Choice. Pro-
ceedings of Design Computing and Cognition '10, Springer. 
9. Czikszentmihalyi M (1988), Society, culture, and person: a systems view of 
creativity, in Sternberg, RJ (ed), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psy-
chological perspectives, Cambridge University Press, pp. 325-339. 
10. Mendel G (1965) Experiments in plant hybridisation, English translation eds. 
Fisher RA and Bennett JH, Oliver & Boyd. 
11. Watson JD and Crick FHC (1953) A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid 
Nature 171, 737-738. 
12. Newell, A. and Simon, H. (1976). Computer Science as Empirical Enquiry: 
Symbols and Search. Communications of the Association for Computing Ma-
chinery 19: 105- 32. 
13. Chomsky N, (1957). Syntactic Structures. Mouton, The Hague. 
14. Crick, F. (1970): Central Dogma of Molecular Biology. Nature 227, 561-563. 
15. Hillier B and Hanson J: 1984, The Social Logic of Space. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
16. Schön DA (1963) Displacement of Concepts. Tavistock, London. 
17. Koestler A (1964) The act of creation. Hutchinson. 
18. Cropley, AJ: 1999, Definitions of creativity, in MA Runco and SR Pritzer 
(eds.), Encyclopedia of Creativity, Academic Press, San Diego, pp. 511–524.    
19. Saunders R and Gero JS (2001) Artificial creativity: A synthetic approach to 
the study of creative behaviour, in JS Gero and ML Maher (eds), Computa-
tional and Cognitive Models of Creative Design V, pp. 113-139. 
20. Berlyne DE (1971) Aesthetics & psychobiology. Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
21. Bergson H (1911) CreativeEvolution, Mitchell A (trans.), Macmillan, London. 
22. Wundt WM, (1874) Grundzüge de physiologischen Psychologie. Engelman, 
Leipzig. 
23. Dekker L and Kingdon J (1995) The shape of space, 1st International Confe-
rence on Genetic Algorithms in Engineering Systems, pp 543–548. 
